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1. Introduction 
The more things change the more they stay the same. Over the last 30 years the largest 
problem facing OECD economies has been persistently high unemployment which 
has defied the prognostications of orthodox economic theory. As a response to the 
anomaly, mainstream theorists have, instead, redefined the problem away by 
assuming, as if blissfully unaware of reality, that it is a freely chosen optimal state. 
After 25 years, Hahn’s (1980: 285) observation is more relevant than ever:  
Even ten years ago one would have taken it for granted that a government should and 
could have a policy designed to reduce the average level of unemployment. Now this 
is no longer so. The case must be made again, if it can be made at all, from scratch. 
In this paper, the paradigm shift in macroeconomics, which has resulted in what we 
might term the unemployment generation, is critically analysed. As a background, 
Figure 1 shows the history of the Australian unemployment rate since the 1850’s to 
illustrate the enormous impact the Great Depression had on unemployment, a pattern 
that was mirrored around the world economies.  
Figure 1 Historical Australian unemployment rate, 1861-2003 
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Figure 2 shows the post WWII unemployment experience in the US and in Europe, 
the latter represented here by France and Germany. A feature which is frequently 
forgotten is that prior to the oil-crises European unemployment was much lower than 
in the US. However, from the 1980’s onwards European unemployment has been 
characterised by a high degree of persistence. 
In this paper we analyse how orthodox economic theory has over the last 50 years 
steadily undermined the notion of involuntary unemployment leading to the eventual 
abandonment by policy makers of full employment as a legitimate policy goal. In the 
pre-Keynesian era full employment implied that unemployment was voluntary. 
Employment was considered to be determined by the intersection of labour demand 
and labour supply and was thus the outcome of maximising, rational and voluntary 
decision-making by workers and firms. However, in the immediate (post) WWII 
Keynesian era, full employment was recast to become a focus on the provision of 
enough jobs to match the preferences of the labour force. Any remaining 
unemployment (frictions aside) was considered involuntary and due to the failure of 
the monetary economy to generate demand sufficient to meet the savings preferences 
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of the private sector. The turning point in the abandonment of this concept of full 
employment came in the 1950s when the discussion turned to inflation and the trade-
off between the ‘twin evils’ of unemployment and inflation. This era was exemplified 
by the emergence of the Phillips curve literature. However, the orthodox 
reinterpretation of the trade-off was devastating in that the classical (pre-Keynesian) 
notion of a natural unemployment rate (being full employment) was revived. This led 
to a theoretical rejection of the efficacy of aggregate demand management policies 
aimed at keeping unemployment at its frictional minimum. Accordingly, full 
employment was redefined in terms of a Non-accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment (NAIRU) which was invariant to demand management and the 
concept of involuntary unemployment was abandoned by the dominant economics 
paradigm. The belief became that the unfettered economy would stabilise at the 
NAIRU, an outcome that was the function of voluntary choice. 
Figure 2 Unemployment rates in ‘Europe’ and the US, 1959–2003 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
It is interesting to see how the relatively high unemployment rate in the US in the late 
1950s and 1960s relative to Europe promoted a mainly American debate about 
unemployment in that period. When unemployment rose in the 1970s, the debates on 
both sides of the Atlantic became very intensive and similar. However, with the 
strongly diverging experience after the 1970s, the debates in the US and in Europe 
again took different directions. However, in both cases full employment as a primary 
goal for economic policy disappeared from the horizon. We trace this process below. 
2. From voluntary to involuntary unemployment 
2.1 Introduction 
It is only after the Great Depression that the concept of involuntary unemployment 
appeared explicitly in the literature. The discipline of macroeconomics emerged in 
this period and was built, in part, on the recognition that what might apply for 
individuals in isolation may not apply to all individuals (the so-called fallacy of 
composition). Accordingly, involuntary unemployment was constructed as a systemic 
failure of the economy to provide enough jobs for all those willing to work at existing 
money wages and this conception challenged the dominant Classical competitive 
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paradigm that only allowed for the existence of frictional unemployment. Keynes cast 
the differences between the Classical perspective and the new ‘macroeconomic’ 
perspective in terms of a distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
unemployment. To fully appreciate the differences between these two conceptions on 
unemployment we also need to appreciate the different concepts of equilibrium that 
underpin them. Chick (1983: 21) notes: 
There are two concepts of equilibrium extant in economics: 
1. Equilibrium is a point of rest; forces leading to change are either absent or 
counterveiling. 
2. Equilibrium is a point at which supply equals demand. 
Chick considers the second definition is a special case of the first such that “either 
excess demand or excess supply creates a force leading to a change (e.g., in prices) 
which will eliminate the excess demand or supply”. 
2.2 The classical model: voluntary unemployment 
The Classical model is captured by the Figure 3 depiction of the labour market, where 
w, the real wage is the ratio of the nominal wage, W and the price level P. The real 
wage is considered to be determined ‘in the labour market’ at the intersection of the 
labour demand (Ld) function and the labour supply (Ls) function. 
Figure 3 The classical labour market 
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an employer willing to employ them. This concept of full employment is consistent 
with both ideas of equilibrium noted above being satisfied. Frictional unemployment 
is easily derived from the classical labour market representation, as is voluntary 
unemployment (see  Keynes, 1973: 6). 
2.3 Involuntary unemployment 
Keynes used the inability of the neoclassical economists to explain the reality around 
them in the 1930s to introduce the concept of involuntary unemployment: 
Men are involuntarily unemployed if, in the event of a small rise in the price of wage-
goods relatively to the money-wage, both the aggregate supply of labour willing to 
work for the current money-wage and the aggregate demand for it at that wage would 
be greater than the existing volume of employment. Keynes (1973: 15) 
In terms of the Classical labour market, the clue to the new concept of unemployment 
lay in the understanding that the labour market did not in isolation determine 
employment. Further, the quantity of labour supplied and demanded did not have to 
bear any relation to the ‘neoclassical’ optimal labour supply and labour demand 
schedules (even if the latter existed). 
The essential point is that the demand for labour is derived from the product market as 
a reflection of the demand for final goods. This is depicted in Figure 3 by the vertical 
line at E1, which represents the effective demand constraint that is imposed on the 
labour market from the goods market. In neoclassical terminology, workers at B are 
willing to supply more labour even at lower real wages.  
In what sense do we say that a worker who is involuntarily unemployed is ‘powerless’ 
to change his/her situation? This is also a key question in understanding the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. 
In terms of Figure 3, the neoclassical construction is that at B workers should offer 
themselves at lower real wages to increase the demand for their services. But how 
does an individual worker do this? The real wage is after all a ratio of prices that are 
determined in two separate markets. Firms also are unlikely to risk the wrath of their 
existing workforce by capriciously exploiting slack labour markets to negotiate lower 
money wages for all even if it was institutionally possible to do so. Solow (1980) 
argues that by the 1940s even Pigou agreed this reasoning. 
Additionally, if all workers cut the ‘real wage’ then the fallacy of composition 
inherent in the neoclassical story binds. The outcomes applicable to a single 
individual will not automatically apply for all individuals together costs and incomes 
fall. Accordingly, the neoclassical policy solution that ‘across the board’ real wage 
cuts will reduce unemployment is prone to fail. 
Point B can be constructed as an equilibrium outcome, in the sense that once attained 
the economy would remain there unless something else changed. This violates the 
belief implicit in the second concept of equilibrium discussed above that market 
forces will resolve any discrepancy between supply and demand. However, at point B, 
the labour supply function has no bearing on the labour market outcome. Chick (1983: 
76) notes that at point B “firms’ expectations are fulfilled. They therefore have no 
reason to revise their production plans or to increase employment. The economy is in 
underemployment equilibrium, and it is not a mistake” (emphasis in original). 
So what drives the economy to this underemployment equilibrium where workers are 
involuntarily unemployed? Mitchell and Mosler (2002) show that involuntary 
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unemployment arises when the private sector, in aggregate, desires to earn the 
monetary unit of account, but doesn’t desire to spend all it earns. Firms do not hire 
because they cannot sell the output that would be produced. In this situation, nominal 
(or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless those cuts somehow 
eliminate the desire of the private sector to net save, and thereby increase (investment) 
spending. The only entity that can provide the non-government sector with net 
financial assets (net savings) and thereby simultaneously accommodate any net desire 
to save and eliminate unemployment is the government sector. It does this by (deficit) 
spending. The obvious conclusion is that unemployment occurs when net government 
spending is too low to accommodate the need to pay taxes and the desire to net save. 
3. From involuntary unemployment to full employment 
3.1 A focus on jobs 
The experience of the WWII showed governments that full employment could be 
maintained with appropriate use of budget deficits. The employment growth following 
the Great Depression only accelerated with the onset of the War. In this period, the 
memories of the Great Depression still exerted an influence on the constituencies that 
elected the politicians. All the orthodox neoclassical remedies that had been tried 
during the 1930s largely failed. Following World War II, the problem that had to be 
addressed by governments was how to translate the full employed war economy with 
extensive civil controls and loss of liberty into a fully employed peacetime model. 
The emphasis of macroeconomic policy in the period immediately following the 
Second World War was to promote full employment. Inflation control was not 
considered a major issue even though it was one of the stated policy targets of most 
governments. 
The first major statement addressing this problem came in the form of Beveridge’s 
(1944) Full Employment in a Free Society. This was consistent with the new 
macroeconomic orthodoxy, which saw unemployment as a systemic failure and 
moved the focus from the personal characteristics of the unemployed themselves and 
the prevailing wage levels. Beveridge (1944: 123-135) said: 
The ultimate responsibility for seeing that outlay as a whole, taking public and private 
outlay together, is sufficient to set up a demand for all the labour seeking 
employment, must be taken by the State… 
The emphasis was on jobs. Beveridge defined full employment as an excess of 
vacancies at living wages over unemployed persons. Further, Vickrey (1993) said: 
I define genuine full employment as a situation where there are at least as many job 
openings as there are persons seeking employment, probably calling for a rate of 
unemployment, as currently measured, of between 1 and 2 percent. 
The post WWII period was marked by governments using a range of fiscal and 
monetary measures to stabilise the economy at full employment in the face of 
fluctuations in private sector spending. Unemployment rates were usually below 2 per 
cent throughout this period. Importantly, the economies that avoided the plunge into 
high unemployment in the 1970s maintained a “sector of the economy which 
effectively functions as an employer of the last resort, which absorbs the shocks 
which occur from time to time ...” (Ormerod, 1994: 203). Figures 1 and 2 show that 
the performance of the labour market in the 1960s was in stark contrast to what 
followed, at least for both Australia and for Europe. 
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3.2 The debate shifts – to the ‘price’ of full employment 
In particular the US economists did not think about full employment in this positive 
way for very long before shifting their focus to unemployment targets. This is also 
consistent with Figure 2 which shows that US unemployment was distinctly higher 
than that in Europe and Australia. Initially the US-debate was about what constituted 
the irreducible minimum rate of unemployment (Bancroft, 1950; Dunlop, 1950 among 
others). But soon the debate became tangled up in models of unemployment and 
inflation and the Phillips curve era had begun (Mitchell, 1999). The Phillips curve in 
its various guises proposes a relationship between unemployment and inflation and 
raises the question of the existence and nature of a trade-off between nominal and real 
economic outcomes. 
A crucial development in this context was the estimation of the price inflation-
unemployment rate relationship by Samuelson and Solow (1960). They examined the 
various explanations for inflation in the USA since the end of WWII and did show 
that the existing debate about demand-pull and cost-push inflation suffered from 
observational-equivalence. Both influences delivered a similar outcome captured in 
the ‘Phillips curve’. The estimated model they presented was an excellent aid to 
economic policy makers and thus united academe and the bureaucracy. 
The implications were profound. The policy-making bureaucracy now seemed to be in 
control of both aggregates – the twin evils. As long as the relationship estimated was 
stable then the government could choose what inflation rate they would have by an 
appropriate mix of fiscal and monetary policy operating on unemployment. The 
‘Phillips curve’ of Samuelson and Solow (1980) thus mapped perfectly into the 
existing set of aggregate demand management tools (Ormerod, 1994). 
Significantly, the concept of full employment gave way to the rate of unemployment 
that was politically acceptable in the light of some accompanying inflation rate. But, 
significantly, for what was to come, full employment was no longer debated in terms 
of a number of jobs. In the words of Samuelson and Solow (1960: 192): 
In order to achieve the non-perfectionists goal of high enough output to give us no 
more than 3 per cent unemployment, the price index might have to rise by as much as 
4 to 5 per cent per year. That much price rise would seem to be the necessary cost of 
high employment and production in the years immediately ahead. 
4. From full employment to the natural rate of unemployment 
4.1 The Natural Rate Hypothesis 
The concept of full employment, in the sense outlined above, lost meaning with 
development of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve of Friedman (1968) and 
Phelps (1967). This model spearheaded the resurgence of pre-Keynesian 
macroeconomic thinking in the form of Monetarism. The embedded Natural Rate 
Hypothesis outlined a natural rate of unemployment, where the inflation-
unemployment trade-off was allegedly a trade-off between unemployment and 
unexpected inflation. As workers gained more information the trade-off vanishes. At 
this point there is only one unemployment rate consistent with stable inflation – the 
natural rate of unemployment. As a logical consequence, Friedman (1968: 6) stated 
“There is no long-run, stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment.” 
 8
Friedman (1968: 8) defined the natural rate as follows: 
At any moment of time there is some level of unemployment which has the property 
that it is consistent with equilibrium in the structure of real wages. … A lower level 
of unemployment is an indication that there is excess demand for labor that will 
produce upward pressure on real wage rates. … The ‘natural rate of unemployment’, 
in other words, is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of 
general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them the actual 
structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market 
imperfections, stochastic variability in demand and supplies, the cost of gathering 
information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so 
on. 
We cite Friedman for three reasons: (a) to illustrate his firm commitment to the 
monetarist position; (b) to show how he links the notion of a natural rate to the 
process of wage formation; and (c) to emphasise his view that natural unemployment 
is ‘structurally’ embedded in society. In this sense, it is not exactly clear how he 
wishes to reconcile the notion of a Walrasian general equilibrium with the structural 
characteristics of the labour and commodity markets he mentions. 
The rise in acceptance of Monetarism and its new classical counterpart was not based 
on an empirical rejection of the Keynesian orthodoxy, but “was instead a triumph of a 
priori theorising over empiricism, of intellectual aesthetics over observation and, in 
some measure, of conservative ideology over liberalism. It was not, in a word, a 
Kuhnian scientific revolution” (Blinder 1988: 278). However, the shift in the Phillips 
curve in the 1970s as the OECD economies began to fail was a strong empirical 
endorsement for the Natural Rate Hypothesis, despite the fact that the instability came 
from the supply side. Any Keynesian remedies proposed to reduce unemployment 
were met with derision from the bulk of the profession who had embraced the new 
theory and its policy implications. The Natural Rate Hypothesis now became the 
characterisation of full employment. Consistent with the second definition of 
equilibrium given above, it was asserted that the economy would always tend back to 
a given natural rate of unemployment independent of the path the economy had taken. 
Only microeconomic reforms could lower the natural rate. Accordingly, the policy 
debate became increasingly concentrated on deregulation, privatisation, and 
reductions in the provisions of the Welfare State (Thurow, 1983).  
4.2 The new-classical denial of involuntary unemployment 
The most interesting aspect about the new-classical revolution is that with hindsight it 
is not that much of a revolution. First of all the policy-invariance view developed by 
Lucas that monetary policy at best has a transient effect on employment was already 
widely recognised when “the New Classicals arrived to dazzle us with their attractive 
analysis of the rational expectations case” (Phelps, 1990: 44). Second, Dow (1985: 
148, 154) notes: 
The movement away from adaptive expectations was part and parcel of the move to 
express macroeconomics in terms of a full general equilibrium system, grounded 
explicitly in neo-classical microfoundations.    … the rational expectations hypothesis 
has simply taken the prevailing orthodoxy as applied to macroeconomics to its logical 
conclusion. 
The crucial point of the New Classical intervention is that they considered the 
economy returned to equilibrium following a shock extremely quickly. Dow (1985: 
151-2) says: 
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Unless the system is unstable, rational expectations serve only to propel the system 
towards full equilibrium. … If all individuals believe the economy to be stable, their 
actions will ensure that stability. 
Lucas’ refutation of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment 
as useful concepts is consistent with this view. Lucas (1978: 354) says: 
The recognition that one needs to distinguish among sources of unemployment does 
not in any way imply that one needs to distinguish among types …Accepting the 
necessity of a distinction between explanations for normal and cyclical 
unemployment does not, however, compel one to identify the first as voluntary and 
the second as involuntary, as Keynes goes on to do. 
And as far as the voluntary-involuntary distinction is concerned, Lucas’ (1978: 354) 
famous quote is: 
Thus there is an involuntary element in all unemployment, in the sense that no one 
chooses bad luck over good; there is also a voluntary element in all unemployment, in 
the sense that however miserable one’s current work options, one can always choose 
to accept them. 
This position has led to heated debates, as has Keynes’ original distinction (see De 
Vroey, 2004 for a recent survey). De Vroey does not agree with Lucas’ position that 
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment is meaningless. 
Following Lucas’ line of thought, the distinction implies that individuals are to some 
extent always responsible for their own positions. The notion that the free market 
should be the dominant, if not sole coordination mechanism in an economy – which 
underlies the New Classical view – is consistent with a high ‘boundary of 
responsibility’ for individuals, and therefore the voluntary depiction of unemployment 
in New Classical thought is not surprising. However, Lucas (1978: 356) adds to that: 
… one finds to one’s relief that treating unemployment as a voluntary response to an 
unwelcome situation does not commit oneself to normative nonsense like blaming 
depressions on lazy workers …The effect it has on normative discussion is twofold. 
First it focusses discussion of monetary and fiscal policy on stabilization, on the 
pursuit of price stability… Some average unemployment rate would, of course, 
emerge from such a policy but as a by-product, not as a preselected target. Second, by 
thinking of the natural rate as an equilibrium emerging from voluntary exchange in 
the usual sense, one can subject it to the scrutiny of modern methods of public finance 
(emphasis in original). 
The implied disappearance of unemployment from the centre of the policy debate is 
also observed by the Hahn quote in our introduction.  
Solow (1980:3) states when referring to “the old tension between market efficiency 
and market failure … My own belief … lies with the market failure side. That is to 
say, I believe that what looks like involuntary unemployment is involuntary 
unemployment.” This opens the way for quantity constrained equilibria. 
5. From the natural rate of unemployment to the NAIRU 
5.1 Divergent debates on either side of the Atlantic 
The oil crises in the early and late 1970s had a very different impact on the economies 
of both sides of the Atlantic, as can be seen from Figure 2. It seems plausible to us 
that these divergent economic developments played an important role to explain that 
the debate on unemployment took quite different directions. In the US, the rational 
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expectations revolution dominated the economic debate and New Classical economics 
gained in popularity. Accordingly, unemployment was analysed from the perspective 
of intertemporal substitution and real business cycle theory. This view was challenged 
by New Keynesians who sought to develop an explanation for wage rigidities and 
highlighted coordination failures. By the 1990s, the focus of the US macroeconomic 
policy debate was on inflation rather than unemployment (see Chang, 1997). 
In Europe, New Classical economics never really played a serious role in the 
academic debate with Minford as a notable exception. Instead, there were two major 
influences. First, French speaking economists Malinvaud and Drèze led the 
disequilibrium approach. Second, the English economists such as Layard and Nickell 
developed an explanation of unemployment persistence within models of wage and 
price setting behaviour under the rubric of the ‘battle between mark-ups’. The latter 
view, where the NAIRU has centre stage, became dominant in the European 
macroeconomic policy debate. We elaborate on this in Mitchell and Muysken (2004). 
5.2 The Layard, Nickell and Jackman approach 
Layard and Nickell’s work pushed the NAIRU framework into the European 
academic spotlight and the culmination Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) 
(hereafter LNJ) has become an extremely influential work (Mitchell and Muysken, 
2004) in three ways: (a) it was the ‘brains’ behind the OECD (1994) Jobs Study which 
has set the policy agenda for most European and other OECD countries since; (b) it 
had a powerful effect on the EUs European Employment Strategy; and (c) it had a 
lasting impact on academic research and teaching in Europe. 
Following Friedman (1968), LNJ (1991: 12-13) construct unemployment as arising 
from the consequences of the battle between mark-ups on wages and prices: 
Only if the real wage desired by wage-setters is the same as that desired by price-
setters will inflation be stable. And the variable which brings about this consistency is 
the level of unemployment. … Thus, unemployment is the mechanism which ensures 
that the claims on national output are compatible … [thus] … There is indeed a 
long-run equilibrium at which both unemployment and inflation will be stable. 
We call this the long-run NAIRU ... (emphasis in original).  
Although they apparently wish to avoid the conclusion that the NAIRU is an 
inevitable outcome of the economic process, they cannot but help to describe it as “the 
state to which the system will return after a disturbance” (LNJ, 1991: 9). Moreover, 
“In the long run, unemployment is entirely determined by long-run supply factors and 
equals the NAIRU” (LNJ, 1991: 16). Hence LNJ adhere to both equilibrium concepts 
mentioned above, although in the context of the battle between mark-ups instead of 
market clearing in the second case. 
The equilibrium rate of unemployment is influenced by anything that shifts the 
Beveridge curve, in particular search effectiveness. The latter is central to their 
analysis through its impact on the notion of voluntary unemployment. LNJ (1991: 11) 
note: 
Even when unemployment is high, there are no queues for all vacancies. There is a 
secondary sector in the labour market that does more or less clear … If people are 
unemployed, it is generally because they have decided against these jobs. They are 
however willing to work in a range of ‘good’ primary sector jobs, but they cannot get 
them. In this sense unemployment is both voluntary and involuntary. 2 
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LNJ (1991: 34) also stress that the unemployed should be vigorous in their search 
activity so that “firms can get workers more easily and disemployed people face 
fiercer competition for jobs. Thus if unemployed seek harder, there need be fewer of 
them in order to restrain wage pressure.” This leads LNJ to conclude that it is the 
‘effective’ unemployed that is the relevant discipline on wage bargaining rather than 
the actual number of unemployed.  
Another implication of their reason is that rising long-term unemployment (and 
reduced search effectiveness) reduces the impact of overall unemployment on wage 
outcomes. As a consequence LNJ (1991: 10) say “There is however some ‘short-run 
NAIRU’, which would be consistent with stable inflation, and which of course 
depends on last year’s unemployment” Thus hysteresis may play a role. LNJ (1991: 
18) say the short-run NAIRU “lies between last period’s unemployment and the long-
run NAIRU.” This also implies that “…in the short-run, unemployment is determined 
by the interaction of aggregate demand and short-run aggregate supply … [but as LNJ 
hasten to add] … In the long run, unemployment is entirely determined by long-run 
supply factors and equals the NAIRU” (LNJ, 1991: 16). Moreover, “… if financial 
policy ensures that inflation is stable, then unemployment will adjust to its 
equilibrium level” (LNJ, 1991: 13). The latter is observation is reinforced in Nickell 
and van Ours (2000: 142) when they ask: “Why do we have unemployment?” 
Basically their answer is that authorities are afraid of generating inflation.  
5.3 The US approach to the NAIRU 
Tobin (1996: 326) description of the US approach to unemployment is similar to the 
LNJ approach: 
The English-American approach to unemployment is to investigate the question 
whether the NAIRU has risen spectacularly, and if so why and how. … In the 
mainstream American approach, excess supply unemployment is Keynesian and 
short-run. At existing nominal wages and prices some willing and qualified workers 
can’t get jobs. Such situations are not expected to persist beyond business cycles into 
long or even medium runs. … What leads to such confidence? Some economists 
would stress the ultimate natural equilibration of markets. Other would stress the 
response of macro policy makers. In either case this view is what makes European 
experience so problematic. 
However, there clearly remains a debate in the US with many American authors 
taking a sceptical view of the NAIRU as an attractor for unemployment or as a useful 
policy construct. Stiglitz (1997: 3, 10) has “become convinced that the NAIRU is a 
useful analytic concept. It is useful as a theory to understand the causes of inflation … 
[but] … Unemployment explains only a portion of changes in inflation, and there are 
a variety of other economic goals besides simply fighting inflation.” Gordon (1997: 
11) also sees the NAIRU as an indispensable ingredient in analysing inflation 
“Whether the goal is steady inflation or lower inflation, the FED needs to know the 
value of the NAIRU.” In Gordon’s analysis the NAIRU varies over time. Hysteresis 
hardly plays a role in his analysis, but price inertia plays an important role and he 
deliberately ignores the connection to wage formation. Gordon (1997: 17) says that 
“The earlier fixation on wages was a mistake. The relation of prices to wages has 
changed over time … models with separate wage growth and price markup equations 
do not perform as well as [an equation] in which wages are only implicit”. 
Interestingly enough Gordon also emphasises that the NAIRU is not a universal 
concept. It fits the US post-war experience, but “wild gyrations of the estimated 
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NAIRU over a range too wide to be explained by microeconomic changes in market 
structure and institutions would lead to scepticism about the NAIRU concept … 
When applied to Europe … fluctuations in the NAIRU seem too large to be plausible 
and seem mainly to mimic movements in the actual unemployment rate” (Gordon, 
1997: 28). Ball and Mankiw (2002: 121) also conclude that in the US “it would be 
rash to suggest that the NAIRU is obsolete as a forecasting tool … monetary policy 
makers should keep an eye on unemployment and the NAIRU.” 
However, in the final section of the paper we will see that there is also considerable 
criticism by US economists of the NAIRU concept. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
When compared with the European literature, it is remarkable that the LNJ approach 
hardly plays a role in the American debate. Very few authors refer to their work and 
then, only in a marginal context. Further, the concept of hysteresis hardly plays a role 
in the American debate. It is also remarkable that most authors have a much more 
pragmatic approach to the estimation of the NAIRU, compare Gordon’s triangle 
model and Ball and Mankiw’s Hodrick-Prescott filter approach. This is in stark 
contrast to the simultaneous equations LNJ approach. It is possible that the explicit 
modelling of the labour market in the LNJ approach has led to it having more impact 
on the unemployment debate and has given it more influence in determining the 
labour market policy agenda. 
However, on both sides of the Atlantic the idea that there is a NAIRU (constant or 
time-varying) that defines the inflation constraint has dominated public policy makers 
since the first oil shocks of the 1970s. Monetarist ‘fight-inflation-first’ strategies 
exacted a harsh toll in the form of persistently high unemployment. Full employment 
as initially conceived was abandoned (Hughes, 1980). 
6. From the NAIRU to involuntary unemployment: some way to go 
Galbraith (1997: 106) observes: 
One of the serious unintended consequences of economists’ preoccupation with the 
NAIRU has been to convey a message to political leaders that they need not feel 
responsibility in this area, that the inflation-unemployment trade-off can be fine-tuned 
with interest rates by the FED. 
This might be one of the explanations why many economists have actively opposed 
the notion of a NAIRU. Three broad lines of attack can be distinguished. First, the 
NAIRU is attacked along theoretical lines, although this literature often uses empirical 
work to consolidate the argument (see Mitchell and Muysken, 2003 for a literature 
summary). Blanchard (1997), Phelps (1994) and Phelps and Zoega (1998) amend the 
NAIRU model to include costs of capital which enables them to implicate high real 
interest rates for the European unemployment in the 1980s. Rowthorn (1999) also 
analyses the impact of productivity shocks. Modigliani (2000) and Sawyer (2002) 
emphasise the role of aggregate demand in determining the NAIRU. Numerous 
studies look at the impact of hysteresis (Ball, 1999). Finally Akerlof et al. (2000) 
argue that ‘near-rational behaviour’, which allows for money illusion, causes a trade-
off between unemployment and inflation at relatively low rates of inflation, even in 
the long run. Mitchell and Muysken (2003: 7) conclude “… once deconstructed it is 
little wonder that the concept of equilibrium unemployment loses its original 
‘structural’ meaning and becomes indistinguishable in dynamics from actual 
unemployment.” 
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Second, a growing literature has documented the empirical failings of NAIRU 
models. Campbell and Mankiw (1987, 1989) find non-linearities in the reaction of 
unemployment to shocks. These findings run contrary to the NAIRU approach which 
is built on smooth linear functions. Chang (1997) and Fair (2000) demonstrate that 
inflation dynamics do not seem to accord with those specified in the NAIRU 
hypothesis. There is no clear correlation between changes in the inflation rate and the 
level of unemployment, such that inflation rises and falls at many different 
unemployment rates without system. The time-varying NAIRU approach which 
replaced the discredited constant NAIRU depiction has been similarly tainted by lack 
of economic and empirical content. The arbitrary use of atheoretical univariate filters 
(Hodrick-Prescott filters) and Kalman Filters is symptomatic of the deficiencies and 
the resulting NAIRU estimates are extremely sensitive to underlying assumptions 
about the variance components in measurement and state equations and in signal to 
noise ratios (Gordon, 1997). Spline estimation (Staiger, Stock and Watson, 1997) is 
similarly arbitrary in the choice of knots and the order of the polynomials. 
Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997) find large standard errors for NAIRU estimates 
which render the concept relatively useless for policy analysis (see below). Baker et 
al. (2002) are highly critical of the NAIRU approach after forensically examining a 
large number of NAIRU studies. Similar results are obtained from the meta study of 
Stanley (2004) on hysteresis. Ball (1999) and Modigliani (2000) demonstrate that 
close relationships exist between employment and vacancies growth and the inverse 
of the unemployment rate, and between investment to GDP ratios and the 
unemployment rate across many countries. They are difficult to interpret as being 
driven from the supply-side. 
Third, the usefulness of the NAIRU for policy purposes is also questioned. Chang 
(1997) says: 
In practice, the concept of a nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment is not 
useful for policy purposes. First, the NAIRU moves around. Second, uncertainty 
about where the NAIRU is at any point of time is considerable. Third, even if we 
knew where the NAIRU were, it would be sub optimal to predict inflation solely on 
the basis of the comparison of unemployment against the NAIRU. A policy of raising 
the fed funds rate when unemployment falls below the NAIRU may be 
ineffective...even if the NAIRU were constant, its location were known and all shocks 
to the economy were to come from the demand side. Implementing such policy would 
likely induce changes in the expectations and behavior of the private sector an 
important additional reason to be skeptical about using the NAIRU for policy. 
Modigliani (2000: 3) who introduced the term NAIRU to the economics profession now 
argues: 
Unemployment is primarily due to lack of aggregate demand. This is mainly the 
outcome of erroneous macroeconomic policies… [the decisions of Central Banks] … 
inspired by an obsessive fear of inflation, … coupled with a benign neglect for 
unemployment … have resulted in systematically over tight monetary policy 
decisions, apparently based on an objectionable use of the so-called NAIRU 
approach. The contractive effects of these policies have been reinforced by common, 
very tight fiscal policies (emphasis in original). 
Solow and Taylor (1999) emphasise the dangers inherent in following a NAIRU 
strategy to control inflation. While there may be stability between inflation and 
unemployment for a period, a sudden shock, especially from the supply side (as in 
1974, for example) can exacerbate the costs of unemployment resulting from a 
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deflationary strategy (which attempts to exploit a given Phillips curve). Evidence 
from the OECD experience over the last 25 years suggests that this policy is effective 
in bringing inflation down (Mitchell, 1998; Cornwall, 1983). But rarely are the costs 
of such a strategy computed or addressed despite the overwhelming evidence that the 
costs of sustained high unemployment are enormous (Watts and Mitchell, 2000). 
The overwhelming quandary that the NAIRU approach to inflation control faces is 
whether the economy, once deflated by restrictive aggregate demand management, 
can be restarted without inflation. If the underlying causes of the inflation are not 
addressed a demand expansion will merely reignite the tensions and a wage-price 
outbreak is likely (Cornwall, 1983; Rowthorn, 1980). As a basis for policy the 
NAIRU approach is thus severely restrictive and provides no firm basis for full 
employment and price stability. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented a sequential review of how economists have 
constructed the concept of unemployment. We have argued that the classical depiction 
of unemployment as a voluntary was severely discredited during the Great Depression 
and led to the development of a macroeconomic explanation for unemployment based 
on systemic failure. Accordingly, unemployment was cast as being involuntary 
because individuals were unable to change their jobless state on their own volition. As 
the C20th unfolded, the debate shifted to characterising full employment, not in terms 
of an adequate supply of jobs to match the labour force, but instead, as some policy 
trade-off between the twin evils of unemployment and inflation. The abandonment of 
full employment was nigh. 
By the 1970s, with the influential work of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) making 
inroads into the debate and the disruptions caused by the OPEC shocks, economists 
returned to their classical roots and erroneously recast full employment in terms of a 
natural rate of unemployment. The importance of this shift was that it scorned 
aggregate demand intervention to maintain low unemployment. Any unemployment 
rate was ‘optimal’ and the product of voluntary maximising choice. The policy 
emphasis shift from full employment to ‘full employability’ and the period of active 
labour market programs began in earnest. 
After nearly 30 years of persistently high unemployment and rising 
underemployment, economists are becoming increasingly aware that this conception 
of unemployment is deficient. Debate has once again begun to challenge the 
‘impoverished’ voluntary unemployment conception. 
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